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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

t

CHRISTOPHER BEVARDf

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900550-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted
manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-5-205 (1990).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990)f as the appeal is from a district court
in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a first degree
felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Was the trial court correct in instructing the jury
regarding a lesser included offense of second degree murder,
which instruction was requested by the State and objected to by
defendant?

The trial court has the duty to instruct the jury on

the law applicable to the facts of the case.
627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981).

State v. Potter,

Where the trial court determines

that a requested jury instruction is applicable to the case, that

conclusion is a legal one; legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness.

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,

516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with attempted second degree
murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§
76-4-101 and 76-5-203 (1990), on March 7, 1990 (Record [hereafter
R.] at 19). Prior to trial, defendant requested certain jury
instructions, including instructions that his conduct was
justified as either self-defense or defense of habitation.

These

instructions were given at trial (R. at 32-33).
On September 12, 1990, an amended information was filed
which still charged attempted criminal homicide, but added the
words "by use of a firearm" to the charging language (R. at 3940).

The matter was tried by a jury on September 13-14, 1990, in

the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, the
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, district judge, presiding (R. at
96-100).

The State asked for, and received, jury instructions

for the lesser included offenses of attempted manslaughter and
aggravated assault (R. at 79-80).

The jury convicted defendant

of attempted manslaughter (R. at 95 and 99).

Defendant was

sentenced on October 12, 1990, for the statutory term; the
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sentence was suspended and defendant placed on probation (R. at
101-102).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Because defendant's issues on appeal involve the giving
of a lesser included offense instruction, a recitation of the
facts underlying the conviction will not be necessary.

The facts

pertinent to this appeal are contained in the statement of the
case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that manslaughter
is a statutorily designated lesser included offense of second
degree murder.

Consequently, the court may instruct the jury

regarding this offense at the request of the prosecution, and
over the defendant's objection, if defendant's due process right
to notice and sufficient time to prepare is met.

Defendant

raised the defense of justification before trial and the State
responded with a manslaughter jury instruction using the legal
justification subsection of the manslaughter statute.

Defendant

was on notice and had time to prepare to raise his justification
defense and to address the State's rebuttal that he was not
legally justified in shooting the victim.
Since the court correctly instructed the jury regarding
manslaughter as a lesser included offense, defendant's claim that
he cannot be retried for the greater offense is moot.

-3-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GAVE THE STATE'S
REQUESTED LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
INSTRUCTIONS OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on attempted manslaughter as a lesser
included offense of attempted second degree murder.

While some

aspects of jury instructions are within the discretion of#the
trial court, State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988),
"[t]he trial court has a duty to» instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the facts of the case."
75, 78 (Utah 1981).

State v. Potter, 627 P.2d

Where, as in this case, the trial court

determines that a requested jury instruction is applicable to the
case, that conclusion is a legal one.
reviewed for correctness.

Legal conclusions are

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788

P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).
Jury instructions regarding lesser included offenses,
and the definition of lesser included offenses, are found in the
criminal code.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1990) reads, in

pertinent part:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense
is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged
-4-

or an offense otherwise included therein;
or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense.
Whether, and to what extent, trial courts may charge a jury with
respect to lesser included offenses has been addressed by the
Utah Supreme Court.

In a case similar to the present one*/ a

defendant argued that there was no such crime as attempted
manslaughter.

In State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), the

court held that there is a crime of attempted manslaughter under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (c) (1990)1, the subsection which
was used in the present case.

Id., at 94. As in the present

case, Howell argued that the State "must stand on the formal
charges alleged in the information and that a defendant may only
be tried on those crimes formally charged if the defendant wishes
to hold the State to those charges[.]"

Ld.

The court rejected

this argument, holding
that a trial court may properly give a lesser
included offense instruction, even over a
defendant's objection, if there is clearly no
risk that the defendant will be prejudiced by
1

(1)

That section and subsection read:
Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:

(c) causes the death of another under circumstances where the
actor reasonably believes the circumstances provide a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct is not
legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
-5-

lack of notice and preparation so as to
deprive him of a full and fair opportunity to
defend himself.
Id, at 95• Applying that holding to the facts in that case, the
court determined that the manslaughter instruction given raised
the issue of whether the defendant acted with moral or legal
justification.

Such a justification was not a prima facie

element of the murder originally charged; however,
the issue of self-defense was fully
litigated. For all practical purposes, the
defendant, in relying on self-defense as a
defense to the murder charges, attempted to
prove a justification for the homicide. The
same basic facts were equally at issue in the
manslaughter charge. The fundamental factual
defense was the same under all the charges.
There was, therefore, no surprise or lack of
preparation necessary to litigate the "moral
or legal justification" element of
manslaughter.
Id. at 95-96.
Defendant contends that the holding in Howell is
incorrect in light of State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983).
The court's holding in Baker applies only to situations wherein a
defendant seeks a jury instruction on lesser included offenses;
however, in dicta, the court did lay ground rules for situations
in which the prosecution requests such instructions.
[W]hen the prosecution seeks instruction on a
proposed lesser included offense, both the
legal elements and the actual evidence or
inferences needed to demonstrate those
elements must necessarily be included within
the original charged offense.
Id. at 156 (emphasis in original) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402(3)(a)).

Two months later, the court explained that Baker

-6-

"authoritatively construed" subsection (3)(a) of Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-402.

State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah 1983).

However, the court held that manslaughter is a lesser included
offense of second degree murder based on subsection (3)(c);
consequently, they found that the language of Baker was not
applicable in determining whether manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of second degree murder.

Id.

Subsection (3)(c) provides that an offense is included
when "[i]t is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser
included offense."
Crick, the court

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(c) (1990).

In

ft

conclude[d] that § 76-5-201 and the succeeding

sections under the heading of 'criminal homicide' (through § 765-207 amount to . . . a designation" that those crimes are lesser
included offenses of homicide. Id. at 530.

Section 76-5-201

states:
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if
he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or
with criminal negligence unlawfully causes
the death of another.
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the
first and second degree, manslaughter, or
negligent homicide, or automobile homicide.
Citing this section, the supreme court said:
In the succeeding sections [to § 76-5-201],
the Code sets out the statutory definitions
of the various types of criminal homicide,
each (except for automobile homicide) in
descending order of seriousness. This
structure—notably the identification of the
crime of criminal homicide and the
specification of common elements in § 76-5201, and the relationships inherent in the
succeeding sections—fulfills the §76-1402(3)(c) requirement of specific (statutory)
designation of a lesser included offense.
-7-

Consequently, all of the various degrees of
homicide have the relationship of greater and
lesser included offenses.
Id. at 530 (footnote omitted).

Using subsection (3)(c) of the

lesser included offenses statute, the court has resolved the
question of lesser included offenses in the context of the
criminal homicide statutes. All of the various degrees of
homicide have greater and lesser relationships.

In other words,

by specific statutory designation, manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of second degree murder.
Because manslaughter is a lesser included offense, the
prosecution is entitled to a jury instruction on the offense,
even over defendant's objection2, if there is no risk that the
defendant will be prejudiced by lack of notice and preparation.
Howell, 649 P.2d at 95. Just as in Howell, defendant in the
present case was not prejudiced by the State's requested
instruction on attempted manslaughter.

By his own requested

instructions, defendant made it clear well before trial that he
2

It is questionable if defendant properly preserved his
objection to the instruction at trial.
Mid-trial, defendant
objected to the requested lesser included offense instructions by
saying:
Our objection is that we feel the lesser
included option should be with the defendant;
that the state should choose what charge they
intend to prosecute under.
(R. 120 [Transcript of trial] at 116). This objection did not
alert the trial court to defendant's appellate argument that
manslaughter is not necessarily a lesser included offense of second
degree murder. Therefore, this Court could decline to address the
merits of this case based on defendant's failure to properly
preserve this issue. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah
1989) (grounds for objection must be distinctly and specifically
stated in trial court to preserve issue on appeal).
-8-

was intending to rely on the justification of self-defense or of
defense of habitation (R. at 32-33).

A month before trial, the

prosecution requested a lesser included instruction on attempted
manslaughter which contained the language of Utah Code Ann. § 765-205(1)(c) regarding legal justification or excuse (R. at 46).
Defendant was on notice that the State was going to rebut his
claim of justification for the shooting.

Defendant was accorded

due process because he had adequate notice of the charges against
him through either the original charge or the State's pretrial
request for a lesser included offense instruction.

He also had

sufficient time to prepare his defense of justification and to
address the State's claim that defendant was not legally
justified in shooting the victim.

Howell, 649 P.2d at 95.

Because defendant's due process right was preserved, the court
correctly instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of
attempted manslaughter.
Since the lesser included offense instruction was
proper, the State will not address defendant's claim that he
cannot be retried.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/ W ^ d a y of June, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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